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BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE DAWN OF A METAVERSE
Kuzi Charamba*
ABSTRACT
Technological advances in the 21st century pose new threats to
human rights from business activities. In this new technological age,
individuals and communities engage through an increasing myriad of
digital means and platforms, all facilitated by a smaller, more powerful
set of global BigTech companies, such as Microsoft, Apple, Google,
and Meta (formerly known as Facebook). In so doing, however, our
lives as workers, consumers, and citizens become subject to increasing
corporate control through surveillance capitalism and algorithmic
governance. With the dawn of metaverses—3D immersive digital
environments in which you can interact with others via avatars and
through virtual and augmented reality—upon us, some commentators
anticipate that BigTech control over our (digital) lives could be allconsuming. Given the negative impacts and threats to human rights
resulting from the current dominance of BigTech companies, it is not
difficult to imagine how we could be at the beginning of a ‘Ready
Player One’ dystopian reality: ensconced in digital, state-like walled
gardens that are controlled by a handful of companies wielding
sovereign-like authority. This would challenge theoretical foundations
underpinning the operation of international human rights law and
how corporations are considered within it. As such, it is important to
revisit the adequacy of governance frameworks for the protection of
human rights in a truly digital age. In so doing, this Article questions
how we can understand corporate responsibility in relation to human
rights in digital milieux, it discusses the adequacy of the UN Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights, and it posits that we should
consider a corporate responsibility to respect and protect (digital)
human rights. The article also engages with the interesting tangential
development of Web2 versus Web3 realities, and argues that the
distinction at present does not negate the force of the arguments
*
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presented towards considering a corporate responsibility to protect
human rights in a metaverse.
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INTRODUCTION
Technological advances in the 21st century pose new threats to
human rights from business activities. In this new technological age,
individuals and communities engage through an increasing myriad of
digital means and platforms, all facilitated by a smaller, more powerful
set of global BigTech companies, including Microsoft, Apple, Google,
Meta (formerly known as Facebook), and Amazon (MAGMA). 1 In
doing so, however, our lives as workers, consumers, and citizens have
become subject to increasing corporate control through surveillance
capitalism 2 and algorithmic governance. 3 When operating on
See, e.g., Paul Mozur et al., A Global Tipping Point for Reigning In Tech Has
Arrived, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/
technology/global-tipping-point-tech.html; see also Nienke Palstra, Who runs the
world… Big Tech?, GLOB. WITNESS (July 30, 2020), https://www.globalwitness.org
/en/ blog/who-runs-world-big-tech.
2
See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).
3
See Swati Srivastava, Algorithmic Governance and the International Politics of Big
Tech, 20 PERSPS. ON POL. 1, 1-12 (2021); see also S. C. Olhede & P. J. Wolfe, The
growing ubiquity of algorithms in society: implications, impacts and innovations, 376
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENG’G SCIS. 1,
3 (2018); see also Mireille Hildebrandt, Algorithmic regulation and the rule of law,
1
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platforms, it can be much harder for individuals to maintain privacy,
express themselves freely, unionize, or avoid prejudicial bias when
applying for credit or a job. 4 With the dawn of metaverses—3D
immersive digital environments in which you can interact with others
via avatars and through virtual and augmented reality—upon us,
some commentators anticipate that BigTech control over our digital
lives could be all-consuming. 5 This could have both positive and
negative ramifications. After all, a metaverse is a digital world in
which all the hallmarks of the physical world—such as work, play,
trade, friendship, and love—can be recreated.6 Given the negative
impacts and threats to human rights resulting from the current
dominance of BigTech companies, it is not difficult to imagine how we
could be at the beginning of a Ready Player One 6 dystopian reality:
ensconced in digital, state-like walled gardens that are controlled by a
handful of companies wielding sovereign-like authority. As such, it is
important to revisit the adequacy of governance frameworks for the
protection of human rights in a truly digital age.

376 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENG’G SCIS.
1, 1-9 (2018).
4
See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2016).
5
See John David N. Dionisio, The Metaverse could actually help people, MIT TECH.
REV. (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/10/27/1036817/
metaverse-facebookvirtual-reality-augmented; see also What is the metaverse?,
ECONOMIST (May 11, 2021), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains
/2021/05/11/what-is-the-metaverse; Dan Milmo, Enter the metaverse: the digital
future Mark Zuckerberg is steering us toward, GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2021, 3:14 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/oct/28/facebook-mark-zuckerbergmeta-metaverse. It should be noted that there is a difference between a metaverse and
Web3. The metaverse is an immersive digital reality that can be, but is not necessarily,
an application built on Web3, blockchain based infrastructure. A metaverse could also
be constituted through virtual and augmented reality technologies, as is being done by
Meta through their proposed offering, Horizon Worlds. See, e.g., Horizon Worlds,
METAQUEST, https://www.oculus.com/horizon-worlds/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2022). The
use of the term “digital” in parentheses is intentional, as it aims to highlight an uneasy
tension and inability to separate the digital world from the physical world. It is difficult
to say what the “real” world is, as that is increasingly subjective.
6
Horizon Worlds, supra note 5.
6
Ready Player One (Steven Spielberg dir., 18). Ready Player One is a 2018
American science fiction adventure film based on Ernest Cline‘s novel of the same
name.
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Prevailing conceptions of human rights, as manifested in
international human rights laws, are rooted in a unitary, vertical
relationship between the state and an individual. 7 They reflect the idea
that the state, as sovereign, is the predominant oppressive power
acting on the individual. 8 As such, states have an international legal
obligation to “respect, protect and fulfil” human rights. 9 Yet
corporations, who can also wield oppressive power against
individuals, are subject merely to a “responsibility to respect human
rights”: a conduct-based moral responsibility of due diligence that
requires them to consider and manage their impacts on individuals’
human rights during their business activities. 10 This distinction, which
is reflected in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (UNGPs), 11 is neither theoretically justifiable nor congruent
with societal realities today. As such, this Article will revisit some
underpinnings of this distinction and juxtapose them against the
current power and authority of corporations, particularly in this
digital age. In so doing, this Article will question how we can
understand corporate responsibility in relation to human rights in
digital milieux and posit that we should consider a corporate
responsibility to respect and protect (digital) human rights. This overall
argument is constituted by sub-arguments that take consequentialist,
theoretical, and functional forms. The consequentialist sub-argument
speaks to the factual outcome of greater risks to human rights within
digital spaces that are facilitated by the nature of BigTech and, more
generally, corporate activity within these spaces. The theoretical subargument engages with the proposition that corporations, in some
ways, have upended the presumptive position of juridical
subordinates to the state when considered in light of the authority that
they hold within digital spaces to govern and determine individuals’
actions, interactions, and transactions. Finally, the functional subKUZI CHARAMBA, HIRED GUNS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND
ACCESS TO REMEDIES IN THE PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY INDUSTRY 128 (2020).
8
Frances Raday, Privatising Human Rights and the Abuse of Power, 13 CANADIAN
J.L. & JURIS. 103, 108-10 (2000).
9
U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, 6, U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
10
Id. at 13.
11
Id. at 3.
7
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argument speaks to the prevailing conceptions that we hold in relation
to the exercise of regulatory authority. Prevailing conceptions posit
that regulatory authority should be a function exercised by public
actors in contradistinction to private actors. However, when one
considers this position against the consequential and theoretical
arguments presented within this Article, there are legitimate grounds
to challenge prevailing orthodoxy and thus to consider the idea that
private actors, because of the power and authority that they wield
within particular spaces, should have some responsibility of
regulating those spaces. This idea draws from the principle within
financial regulation of “same activity, same regulation.” 12 Emphasis is
placed on the idea of exercising regulatory function as a responsibility
rather than a privilege.
Subsequently, in relaying these arguments, the remainder of
the Article will be structured as follows: Section One provides an
exposition of recent technological advances in society and how they
pose new risks to human rights. Section Two discusses the
shortcomings of the human rights system and its inability to
acknowledge the growing threat to human rights by corporations. Its
demonstration of impacts to human rights within digital spaces
provides the grounds for the consequentialist argument. Section Three
presents the arguments for upending the current system of human
rights protection in light of corporate power in a metaverse. This is
founded upon the theoretical and functional arguments. Finally,
Section Four engages with the interesting tangential development of
Web2 versus Web3 realities, and how the distinction at present does
not negate the force of the arguments presented towards considering
a corporate responsibility to protect human rights in a metaverse.
Importantly, this does not imply a diminution of existing state
obligations to protect human rights.

UK FIN., SAME ACTIVITY, SAME RISK, SAME REGULATION 1 (2021); see also FIN.
STABILITY BD., DECENTRALISED FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES: REPORT ON FINANCIAL
STABILITY, REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS 1 (2019); see also BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIG TECH IN FINANCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS 55 (2019).
12
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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES, NEW HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS,
AND THE CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENT

Commentators broadly acknowledge that we have entered a
new technological era. Thomas Friedmann, perhaps one of the earlier
commentators, referred to an early iteration of this period as
“Globalization 3.0.” 13 Klaus Schwab preferred the term, “The Fourth
Industrial Revolution,” 14 and Azeem Azhar spoke more recently about
the onset of “The Exponential Age.” 15 While there are differences
between these conceptual paradigms, collectively, they attempt to
describe a new state of development in our societies and economies
that impacts the ways that we act, transact, and interact. These
changes, driven by a shift towards digitalization and datafication, are
changing the ways that we shop, work, socialize, bank, and love,
among other things. 16 Through emergent technologies such as
artificial intelligence (AI), big data, cloud computing, the Internet-ofThings (IoT), and digital ledger technologies, which includes
blockchain technology, there is so much more that we can do through
our smartphones and other smart devices. 17 Through robotics and
automation, we have been able to collectively increase productivity
and economic output, make advances in biotechnologies, and enter the
age of driverless transportation. 18 There is remarkable convenience in
being able to bank, make contactless payments, and secure work or gig
opportunities through your smartphone, particularly in the wake of
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 19 This innovation has also been a
13
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 10 (2005).
14
KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 11 (2017).
15
AZEEM AZHAR, THE EXPONENTIAL AGE: HOW ACCELERATING TECHNOLOGY IS
TRANSFORMING BUSINESS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (2021).
16
Hannah Trittin-Ulbrich et al., Exploring the Dark and Unexpected Sides of
Digitalization: Toward a Critical Agenda, 28 SAGE J. 1, 8 (2020).
17
SCHWAB, supra note 14.
18
Id.; see also Technology and Innovation Report 2021, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON
TRADE & DEV., https://unctad.org/page/technology-and-innovation-report-2021 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2022).
19
See, e.g., Technology and Innovation Report 2021, supra note 18; see also OECD,
DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE AGE OF COVID-19: BUILDING RESILIENCE AND
BRIDGING DIVIDES 1 (2020).
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boon for economic growth and sustainable development
opportunities, particularly in the developing world. 20 For example, AI
and machine learning are being used in South Africa to develop
systems that allow people to locate nearby mobile healthcare clinics in
regions without primary healthcare facilities; 21 Zenvus in Nigeria
seeks to improve decision-making for farmers by providing insights
based on data collected from sensors and other means; 22 and Tala in
Kenya uses a mobile app to assess and disburse loans to financially
excluded and unbanked customers without a credit history by
analyzing their Facebook and SMS data to determine their risk of
default. 23 Conversely, however, these positive impacts are matched
equally by nefarious actors and possibilities. Facial recognition
technology, which is utilized by some governments, could help to
further authoritarian rule and a diminution of individual liberties
through stronger policing controls; 24 AI-generated “deepfakes” could
help to facilitate fraud and cybercrime; 25 and data mining through
social media sites continues to pose a significant threat to electoral
processes and political outcomes, as was the case with the 2017 Kenya
election. 26 Women and girls also face particular risks online, as is
evidenced by continuing reports of harassment and threats of violence

U.N. Secretary-General’s Task Force on Digital Financing of the Sustainable
Development Goals, People’s Money: Harnessing Digitalization to Finance a
Sustainable Future (Aug. 2020).
21
See Ayomide Owoyemi et al., Artificial Intelligence for Healthcare in Africa, 2
FRONTIERS DIGIT. HEALTH 1, 1-2 (2020).
22
ZENVUS, https://www.zenvus.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2022).
23
TALA, https://tala.co.ke (last visited Oct. 5, 2022).
24
Justin Sherman, The Troubling Rise of Facial Recognition Technology in
POL.
REV.
(Apr.
23,
2020),
Democracies,
WORLD
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/the-troubling-rise-of-ai-facial-recognitiontechnology-in-democracies.
25
Mika Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH.
INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 39, 39 (2019).
26
Justina Crabtree, Here’s how Cambridge Analytica played a dominant role in
Kenya’s chaotic 2017 elections, CNBC (Mar. 23, 2018, 10:31 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/23/cambridge-analytica-and-its-role-in-kenya-2017elections.html.
20
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in the “manosphere,” 27 the growing issue of revenge porn, 28 and AIgenerated deepfake porn. 29 As such, technological innovation poses
new kinds of risks and threats to human rights.
In previous iterations of industrial development, human rights
risks from business activities were of a much more visceral nature. In
the later parts of the 20th century and early 2000s, the idea of businessrelated human rights violations entailed garment sweatshops, factory
catastrophes, such as at Bhopal, and child labor abuse in agricultural
supply chains. 30 These human rights risks continue to be a significant
concern globally. However, the onsets of automation, robotics, and
algorithmic governance have brought about new kinds of businessrelated human rights risks. Many of these risks are borne from the
(mis)governance of the commodity that fuels this technology: data. 31
Increasing smartphone usage, enhanced biometric data collection,
access to new fintech products, and digitization of more sectors of the
economy and public services have resulted in the increased collection,
processing, and storage of personal data, which leaves us prone to
abuse and exploitation by both state and non-state actors. When done

See Charlotte Jee, A feminist internet would be better for everyone, MIT TECH. REV.
(Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/04/01/1020478/feministinternet-culture-activist-harassment-herd-signal/
(The “manosphere” is an informal term that refers to “a loose collection of websites
and online groups dedicated to attacking feminists and women more generally.”).
28
See, e.g., Revenge Porn: The Facts, U.K. GOV’T. (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/405286/revenge-porn-factsheet.pdf (“Revenge Porn is the sharing of
private, sexual materials, either photos or videos, of another person without their
consent and with the purpose of causing embarrassment or distress. The images are
sometimes accompanied by personal information about the subject, including their full
name, address and links to their social media profiles.”).
29
See, e.g., Justin Sherman, “Completely horrifying, dehumanizing, degrading”: One
woman’s fight against deepfake porn, CBS NEWS (Oct. 14, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/deepfake-porn-woman-fights-online-abuse-cbsnoriginals.
30
See, e.g., JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013).
31
The World’s Most Valuable Resource; Regulating the Data Economy, ECONOMIST,
May 6, 2017, at 10.
27
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for economic gain, Shoshana Zuboff refers to this as “surveillance
capitalism.” 32
According to Zuboff, surveillance capitalism is a “new
economic order that claims human experience as free raw material for
hidden commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales.” 33
[It] unilaterally claims human experience as free raw
material for translation into behavioral data. Although
some of these data are applied to product or service
improvement, the rest are declared as a proprietary
behavioral surplus, fed into advanced manufacturing
processes known as “machine intelligence,” and
fabricated into prediction products that anticipate what
you will do now, soon, and later. Finally, these
prediction products are traded in a new kind of
marketplace for behavioral predictions [called]
behavioral futures markets. Surveillance capitalists have
grown immensely wealthy from these trading
operations, for many companies are eager to lay bets
on our future behavior. 34
One area where this extractive use of data and algorithms has
had deleterious human rights impacts is in relation to labor rights.
Amazon and other large tech firms increasingly employ AI to manage
and supervise their employees. Jeremias Adams-Prassl refers to this as
the rise of the “algorithmic boss”: a scenario whereby the relationship
between management and worker is increasingly intermediated by an
algorithm that provides workers with and evaluates them on their
targets, their work schedules, and their appraisals. 35 As Adams-Prassl
elaborates, “[t]he labor market challenges inherent in a world of
platform-based labor intermediation are considerable, from worker

ZUBOFF, supra note 2.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Jeremias Adams-Prassl, What if Your Boss Was an Algorithm? Economic Incentives,
Legal Challenges, and the Rise of Artificial Intelligence at Work, 41 COMPAR. LAB. L.
& POL’Y. J. 123, 133 (2019).
32
33
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classification and collective rights protection through to health and
safety, tax, and social security provisions.” 36
In the pursuit of greater efficiencies, algorithms provide
employers a means through which they can exert greater control over
worker output without having to navigate the challenges that are
inherent in human interactions. For example, algorithms have been
used to screen applicants in the recruitment process, make offers, and
determine appropriate salary levels. 37 On the other end of the
spectrum, AI is used to fire workers if the system determines that they
have not met set targets. For example, documents obtained by The
Verge show how “Amazon’s system tracks the rates of each individual
associate’s productivity . . . and automatically generates any warnings
or terminations regarding quality or productivity without input from
supervisors.” 38 This can have a detrimental impact on workers. For
instance, some employees are reported to avoid bathroom breaks to
ensure that they meet their expectations. 39 Similar accounts of poor
warehouse working conditions have emerged from Coupang, 40 the
leading South Korean e-commerce firm and self-proclaimed “Amazon
of South Korea.” 41 This raises several issues of worker health and
safety, but more pertinently, the use of an algorithm to manage
Id. at 123.
Ulrich Leicht-Deobald et al., The Challenges of Algorithm-Based HR DecisionMaking for Personal Integrity, 160 J. BUS. ETHICS 377, 380 (2019).
38
Colin Lecher, How Amazon automatically tracks and fires warehouse workers for
‘productivity’, VERGE (Apr. 25, 2019, 12:06 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/
25/18516004/amazon-warehouse-fulfillment-centers-productivity-firingterminations.
39
Nina Shapiro, Under Pressure, afraid to take bathroom breaks? Inside Amazon’s
fast-paced warehouse world, SEATTLE TIMES (July 3, 2018, 6:35 PM), https://www
.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/under-pressure-afraid-to-take-bathroom-breaksinside-amazons-fast-paced-warehouse-world; Shannon Liao, Amazon warehouse
workers skip bathroom breaks to keep their jobs, say report, VERGE (Apr. 16, 2018,
2:11 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/16/17243026/amazon-warehouse-jobsworker-conditions-bathroom-breaks.
40
Max S. Kim, This company delivers packages faster than Amazon, but workers pay
the price, MIT TECH. REV. (June 9, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com
/2021/06/09/1025884/coupang-amazon-labor-costs-worker-death.
41
Choe Sang-Hun & Lauren Hirsch, South Korea’s Answer to Amazon Debuts on
Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/11/
business/korea-coupang-ipo.html.
36
37
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workers entails many of the known deficiencies inherent to AI in social
relations. For example, Amazon was forced to stop using its
recruitment tool after it was discovered that it was systematically
rejecting female candidates for engineering roles. 42 This kind of
algorithmic bias is also prevalent in relation to race, sexual orientation,
and disabilities. 43 In reflection, Michelle Bachelet, the UN Human
Rights Commissioner, commented:
Real world inequalities are reproduced within
algorithms and flow back into the real world. Artificial
intelligence systems cannot capture the complexity of
human experience and need. Digital systems and
artificial intelligence create centers of power, and

Maya Oppenheim, Amazon scraps ‘sexist AI’ recruitment tool, INDEPENDENT (Oct.
11, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/amazon-ai-sexist-recruitm
ent-tool-algorithm-a8579161.html. The challenge of discriminatory algorithms can be
particularly challenging to overcome. In a related study, Anja Lambrecht and
Catherine Tucker found that an advertisement campaign for STEM careers was
inadvertently discriminatory against women. This happened because younger women
are a prized demographic and are more expensive to show ads to. An algorithm that
simply optimizes cost-effectiveness in ad delivery will deliver ads that were intended
to be gender-neutral in an apparently discriminatory way, because of crowding out.
The authors show that this empirical regularity extends to other major digital
platforms. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical
Study of Apparent Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads,
65 MGMT. SCI. 2966, 2976–78 (2019).
43
Alexandra Reeve Givens, How Algorithmic Bias Hurts People with Disabilities,
SLATE (Feb. 6, 2020, 5:15 PM) https://slate.com/technology/2020/02/algorithmicbias-people-with-disabilities.html. The issue of hiring bias was recently highlighted
by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and the calls to ensure that AI-facilitated
hiring does not discriminate based on race, gender, and sexual orientation. In
particular, the BLM movement stressed the importance of racial equality and
representation in both tech and non-tech hiring. See, e.g., Peter High, Technology’s
Role In Driving Progress In Black Lives Matter, FORBES (July 30, 2020, 9:51 AM),
www.forbes.com/sites/peterhigh/2020/07/30/technologys-role-in-driving-progressin-black-lives-matter/?sh=2a485b1b687e.
42
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unregulated centers of power always pose risks –
including to human rights. 44
Beyond labor concerns, human rights in the digital space can
also be threatened when freedom of expression is curtailed on social
media platforms, or when hatred and incitement of violence is
promoted. 45 This was a particular issue in relation to both the
Rohingya crisis in Myanmar 46 and the storming of the Capitol in
Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021, since Facebook admitted to
allowing the discontent to spread on their site. 47 Similarly,
misinformation and disinformation can impact people’s civil rights
because their election results can be undermined, 48 as well as their
social, economic, and health rights; for example, through
misinformation campaigns regarding the safety of COVID-19 vaccines
and the impacts that this may have on the local economy. 49
Misinformation also plays an insidious role among younger
generations who are more susceptible and gullible to false
information. 50 A survey from Common Sense Media showed that 60%
Michelle Bachelet, Human rights in the digital age, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.
OFF. HIGH COMM’R (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/en/speeches/2019/10/
human-rights-digital-age.
45
See JACOPO BELLASIO ET AL., RAND CORP., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
24 (2021).
46
Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/mya
nmar-facebook.html.
47
Craig Timberg et al., Inside Facebook, Jan. 6 violence fueled anger, regret over
missed warning signs, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2021, 7:36 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/jan-6-capitol-riot-facebook.
48
Anne Applebaum, Democracy is Surprisingly Easy to Undermine, ATLANTIC (June
17, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/06/trump-fraud-stopsteal-copycats/619226.
49
ALICIA BARCENA & CARISSA ETIENNE, ECON. COMM’N FOR LAT. AM. & CARIBBEAN
& PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., COVID-19 REPORT: THE PROLONGATION OF THE HEALTH
CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON HEALTH, THE ECONOMY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 1
(2021) (discussing, in part, how a failure to control Covid-19 through vaccinations can
prolong and accentuate socioeconomic inequities and associated rights).
50
See Jennifer Neda John, Why Generation Z falls for online misinformation, MIT
TECH. REV. (June 30, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/06/30
/1026338/gen-z-online-misinformation (discussing Generation Z’s inclination to
believe false information).
44
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of teenagers who use YouTube to follow current events turn to
influencers rather than news organizations. 51 Influencers, in turn, are
able to accrue large numbers of followers for things that may have little
to do with the political and social issues that they provide commentary
on. Their lack of evidence or expertise in consequential subject matter
does not deter their followers from believing and spreading those
beliefs, all while the positions of true subject matter experts struggle to
gain similar traction. 52 Finally, human trafficking also continues to be
a scourge that is facilitated on social media platforms such as Facebook
and Instagram. 53 As we transition to new technological advancements
like metaverses, these risks will only be amplified, and they form the
basis of the consequentialist argument. This line of reasoning
highlights the factual outcome of greater risks to human rights within
digital spaces that are facilitated by corporations and thus seeks
accountability for the impacts that corporations cause.
[A] metaverse is a 3D immersive environment shared
by multiple users, in which you can interact with
others via avatars. A metaverse can, with the support
of the right technology, feel like real life, with all the
usual elements of work, play, trade, friendship, love—
a world of its own. 54
While metaverses are still very much in their infancy, companies such
as Meta, Microsoft, and Nvidia are investing significant resources
towards their development. 55 Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Meta, has
51
New Survey Reveals Teens Get Their News from Social Media and YouTube,
COMMON SENSE MEDIA (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/aboutus/news/press-releases/new-survey-reveals-teens-get-their-news-from-social-mediaand-youtube.
52
See John, supra note 50.
53
Clare Duffy, Facebook has known it has a human trafficking problem for years. It
still hasn’t fully fixed it, CNN BUS. (Oct. 25, 2021, 7:33 AM), https://edition.cnn.com
/2021/10/25/tech/facebook-instagram-app-store-ban-human-trafficking/index.html.
54
Dionisio, supra note 5.
55
See Meghan Bobrowsky, Big Tech Seeks Its Next Fortune in the Metaverse, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-tech-seeks-its-nextfortune-in-the-metaverse-11636459200; see also Big tech’s supersized ambitions,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2022), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/01/22/bigtechs-supersized-ambitions.
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commented on creating a metaverse as “a system that is already much
like Facebook’s now-familiar communities, photos, videos, and
merchandise, but instead of looking at that content . . . you’d feel as if
you were inside and surrounded by the content.” 56 Similarly, Satya
Nadella, CEO of Microsoft, has described their offering of a metaverse
as “a system in which users can engage with data, processes, and each
other as richly in virtual form as in reality, only with greater speed and
flexibility.” 57 These conceptions of a metaverse bear close resemblance
to depictions in science fiction plots such as Ernest Cline’s Ready Player
One and Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash. 58 On one hand, such
depictions are alluring, given their potential to provide us with new
ways to form global “cloud communities,” 59 interact, and transact. Yet,
on the other hand, given companies’ declared ambitions to
commercialize this space, 60 the depictions may also portend
technological dystopias in which the current threats to human rights
in the digital age are magnified.
For example, given the ambitions for a metaverse to be an
immersive world in which people will be able to connect in more
enhanced ways through virtual and augmented reality, we can
anticipate the development of “cloud communities.” 61 One such
Dionisio, supra note 5.
Id.
58
See ERNEST CLINE, READY PLAYER ONE (2012); NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH
(1992).
59
Liav Orgad, Cloud Communities: The Dawn of Global Citizenship?, in DEBATING
TRANSFORMATIONS OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 257 (Rainer Bauböck ed., 2018)
(“Conceptually, cloud communities have traditional characteristics of political
communities, but not necessarily a physical territory. The communal bond can be
global in nature – such as a shared concern about climate change, ageing, veganism
and animal rights (i.e., a universal community, open to everyone) – or ascriptive, such
as a Jewish / Bahá’í faith / Diasporic Cloud Nations, a form of ‘transnational
nationalism’ (i.e., a selective community, open only to certain members). It can be
thematic or geographic – region, country, state, city, village – based on a shared
interest or territorial identity, even if not corresponding to existing borders or legally
recognised communities. Membership is based on consent; a person can be a member
of several communities or none.”).
60
See, e.g., Martin Schwirn, The developing metaverse: Commercial realities of
extended realities, COMPUT. WKLY. (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.computerweekly.com
/feature/The-developing-metaverse-Commercial-realities-of-extended-realities.
61
Orgad, supra note 59.
56
57
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community could be a global grouping of individuals who identify as
LGBTQ+ and have been longing for association but have been denied
it due to their conservative, repressive, or authoritarian governments.
Pseudonymously or anonymously, through the creation of avatars,
and perhaps even with haptic technology, individuals could engage in
events and associate with other members on a global basis. This is
powerful. One heterosexual couple’s avatars have already gotten
married in a metaverse, 62 so why not individuals whose governments
have yet to legalize same sex marriages or still police same sex
relationships through their criminal law, for example? Equally
powerful, therefore, is the opposite force in which members of those
communities are denied association and expression in the digital
space, persecuted, or subject to violence and hatred. An early tester of
Meta’s metaverse, Horizon Worlds, has already revealed that her
avatar was virtually groped by a stranger within that metaverse. 63 The
incident, acknowledged by Meta, took place during Meta’s beta testing
of Horizon Worlds and was reported on November 26, 2021. 64 While
it may be difficult to decouple conceptually our digital and physical
selves, recent research shows that incidents in virtual reality can elicit
strong negative emotional responses that could be harmful for users in
the physical world if not managed properly. 65 Indeed, David Chalmers
goes so far as to argue that virtual reality is genuine reality. 66
Consequently, whoever controls the exercise of rights, liberties, or
police powers in those spaces has considerable governance authority
and matching responsibility.
62
Steven Kurutz, Getting Married in the Metaverse, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/fashion/metaverse-virtual-wedding.html.
It
should be noted that, while the marriage is not legal in their home jurisdiction of New
York, the act and event were still significant for the couple.
63
Stephen Jones, Meta launched an investigation after a woman said she was groped
by a stranger in the metaverse, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2021, 8:28 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/meta-investigated-woman-claims-she-was-gropedin-metas-metaverse-2021-12.
64
Id.
65
See Raymond Lavoie et al., Virtual experience, real consequences: the potential
negative emotional consequences of virtual reality gameplay, 25 VIRTUAL REALITY
69, 76 (2020).
66
DAVID J. CHALMERS, REALITY +: VIRTUAL WORLDS AND THE PROBLEMS OF
PHILOSOPHY xvii (2022).
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Yet, the exercise of such governance authority by corporate
actors is hardly unprecedented. These forays into uncharted digital
spaces share many parallels with early expeditions of “CompanyStates” that ventured into new lands in the 17th and 18th centuries,
exercising sovereign powers. 67 While they had their incorporation
within their European country of origin, companies such as the
English East India Company were granted charters to “settle, fortifie,
and plant,” 68 which matched Company leaders’ ambitions for “some
place that wee might call our owne.” 69 The parallels between
Company-States and metaverses creating corporations today are
rooted in the companies’ clear incorporation within a jurisdiction, and
yet having the freedom to create new worlds with governance
authority and responsibility over all those who inhabit those spaces.
In some idealized conceptions, a metaverse is envisaged to be a
decentralized space in which users are participants and owners of
identities, property, and artefacts, the latter currently envisaged
through the innovation of both fungible and non-fungible tokens
(NFTs). 70 However, we would be remiss if we were to overlook the
particular capacity of “individual” entities such as Meta and Microsoft
to create vast spaces: their own metaverses in which other individuals
could interact and transact. In this way, these companies would
“modulate between positions of deference and defiance, between
claims to be a ‘mere merchant’ and an independent ‘sovereign.’” 71 As
Stern elaborates further in his account of the Company-State:
Approaching the Company as a form of state and
sovereign, which claimed final jurisdiction and
responsibility over people and places, suggests that the
PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY
MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 3, 3-15 (2011).
68
Id. at 21.
69
Id. at 22.
70
See Tim Ferriss, Chris Dixon and Naval Ravikant — The Wonders of Web3, How to
Pick the Right Hill to Climb, Finding the Right Amount of Crypto Regulation, Friends
with Benefits, and the Untapped Potential of NFTs (#542), TIM FERRISS SHOW (Oct.
28, 2021), https://tim.blog/2021/10/28/chris-dixon-naval-ravikant; see also NFTs:
The metaverse economy, FIN. TIMES, https://www.ft.com/partnercontent/cryptocom/nfts-the-metaverse-economy.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2022).
71
STERN, supra note 67, at 13.
67

126

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 30

history of state formation and of political thought, only
relatively recently extended to include the ideas and
institutions of empire, might be extended even further,
beyond the national form of those states and empires
to apply to a range of corporate communities. Such
bodies politic possessed institutional and political
cultures that both shaped and were shaped by the
ideas, expectations, and behaviors of their leaders,
corporators, and subjects. Though undoubtedly
conditioned by the prolific political economists and
philosophers within its ranks, the ideologies of the
Company-State, and perhaps even the ideas of those
thinkers, arose not in abstraction but in direct response
to the opportunities, challenges, and problems that
Company leaders confronted. 72
This strikes déjà vu as we recall the power that executives such
as Mark Zuckerberg have to determine the community rules of
engagement on their platforms and who gets to participate in them. 73
The hazard and arbitrariness is not lost when one considers their
decision to ban Donald Trump after the storming of the Capitol on
January 6, 2021, 74 while simultaneously being aware that there was
content on its site that was fomenting political division that
contributed to the very same event. 75 Similarly, as whistleblower
Frances Haugen testified, while Facebook executives were actively
pushing to get more children onto Instagram, they were also actively
concealing and disregarding internally produced research that warned

Id. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
See Chris Hughes, Opinion, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebookzuckerberg.html.
74
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Trump is suspended from Facebook for 2 years and can’t return
until ‘risk to public safety is receded’, WASH. POST (June, 4, 2021, 6:10 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/06/03/trump-facebook-oversightboard.
75
See Mike Isaac, Whistle-Blower to Accuse Facebook of Contributing to Jan. 6 Riot,
Memo Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/02/
technology/whistle-blower-facebook-memo.html.
72
73
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them of the deleterious impacts that this could have on teenage girls’
mental health. 76
A metaverse is being presented as a unique digital space—a
normative order that is distinct from the limitations of the physical
world and its associated juridical orders. Yet, the two are still
intricately connected as participants in the former remain tethered to
the latter. Similarly, while governance in one can be distinct from
governance in the other, the two spaces are intertwined by virtue of
the concurrent inhabitance of both spaces by its participants.
Subsequently, as BigTech firms and other corporations such as
decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) 77 seek to advance
into and commercialize this new digital space, a kind of terra nullius
where they can shape and exercise governance authority and power
that impact participants in a myriad of ways, it is worthwhile for us to
consider the adequacy of our existing governance frameworks and
systems in place for human rights protection. The goal should not be
to unduly restrict innovation and the undeniable associated benefits,
but rather to find and apply appropriate railguards that can mitigate
negative risks and ensure accountability for any harm caused.

76
See Georgia Wells et al., Facebook Knows Instagram Is Toxic for Teen Girls,
Company Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2021, 7:59 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girlscompany-documents-show-11631620739.
77
Linda Xie, A beginner’s guide to DAOs (Mar. 12, 2021), https://linda
.mirror.xyz/Vh8K4leCGEO06_qSGx-vS5lvgUqhqkCz9ut81WwCP2o (“A decen–
tralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a group organized around a mission that
coordinates through a shared set of rules enforced on a blockchain.”). DAOs are
comprised of decentralized internet-based communities that are organized through
code to facilitate the collective management of common goods, including cultural and
intangible works, natural resources, economic and industrial production, and social
systems. See Aragon, What is a DAO?, ARAGON’S BLOG (Sept. 27, 2021),
https://blog.aragon.org/what-is-a-dao/; see also Philippe Honigman, What is a DAO?,
HACKERNOON (July 4, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/what-is-a-dao-c7e84aa1bd69.
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AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
ITS APPLICABILITY TO PRIVATE ACTORS

International human rights law consists of legal obligations
that are assumed primarily by the state. 78 In this Westphalian system,
states have an obligation to “respect, protect, and fulfil” human
rights. 79 This requires states to adopt legislative, “judicial,
administrative, educative, and other appropriate measures” across all
arms of government to fulfill their legal obligations. 80 Further, states
then commit themselves to ensuring that their public officials comply
with those obligations. One of the ways that they do so is through the
principle of due diligence, whereby states commit to taking preventive
steps to ensure adherence to their international legal obligations. 81
This commitment can have an indirect effect of constraining privateparty actions as states seek to ensure that their actions comply with
international human rights obligations. Where private parties fail to
conduct themselves in accordance with those obligations, as may be
provided for in a national law, this can result in the state breaching its
international legal obligations. 82 For example, in the case of VelásquezRodríguez v. Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held
that state responsibility may arise:
[N]ot because of the act itself, but because of a lack of
due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to
it as required by [the human rights treaty] . . . [the] state
is obligated to investigate every situation involving a
violation of the rights [under the American
Convention on Human Rights]. If the state apparatus
This is reflected in the fact that a State “possesses the totality of international rights
and duties recognized by international law.” See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in
the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 10 (Apr. 11).
79
U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, supra note 9.
80
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
81
Susan Marks & Fiorentina Azizi, Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights
Obligations: International Mechanisms, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 725, 729‒31 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
82
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (2d ed. 2005).
78
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acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished
and the victim’s full enjoyment of such rights is not
restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to
comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise
of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction. The
same is true when the state allows private persons or groups
to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights
recognized by the Convention. 83
Similarly, in A. v United Kingdom, the European Court of
Human Rights found the United Kingdom (UK) to be in breach of its
convention obligations for failing to provide adequate protection for a
boy who was caned by his stepfather. 84 Even though the stepfather’s
actions were found to be legal at the time, as the then-applicable
national legislation allowed for “reasonable chastisement,” the UK
was deemed to have failed to protect the child and thus violated its
international legal obligation. 85 Private actors do not have direct
human rights obligations under international human rights law. 86
The modern idea of human rights is based on the protection of
an individual’s dignity and autonomy from oppressive power. 87
Predominant conceptions of human rights in the aftermath of World
War II, as manifested in international human rights law, however, are
rooted in a unitary, vertical relationship between the state and an
individual. These conceptions are largely premised on the idea that the
sovereign is the only oppressive power acting on the individual. In this
view, the sovereign, if left unchecked and unrestrained, wields socioVelásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 172, 176 (July 29, 1988) (emphasis added).
84
A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, ¶ 10 (Sept. 23, 1998), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58232%22]}.
85
Id. at ¶ 23.
86
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 80, at ¶ 8; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, General
Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006).
87
Indeed, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights embodies this goal by
declaring that human rights flow from “the inherent dignity of the human person.”
JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 20 (3d ed.
2013) (describing a position commonly held by most human rights proponents today:
“[h]uman rights are ‘needed’ not for life but for a life of dignity, a life worthy of a
human being.”).
83
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economic and legal power that is disproportionately greater than an
individual’s and threatens the individual’s dignity and autonomy. 88
But as we all know, states are not the only perpetrators of
human rights violations. Indeed, there can be more than one source of
oppressive power. 89 As Roderick Macdonald lucidly puts it,
in our day, the most grievous and most frequent
abuses of civil liberties occur in the exercise of private
power. The occasions for discriminatory state action
are both comparatively few and subject to relatively
formalized procedures for their exercise, when
contrasted with an employer’s power to dismiss, a
landlord’s power to exclude the needy, or an
entrepreneur’s refusal to provide service. 90
Cases of harm and negative externalities in the course of business
activities, particularly in developing countries, are widespread, welldocumented, and accepted as cause for concern. 91 The continued
attribution of human rights obligations on the basis of an actor’s status
as either public or private, 92 therefore, is neither theoretically
justifiable nor congruent with the societal realities of today. 93

See Raday, supra note 8.
E.g., Robert McCorquodale, Non-State Actors and International Human Rights
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 97, 97 (Sarah
Joseph & Adam McBeth eds., 2010); see also DAWN OLIVER & JÖRG FEDTKE, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2007); Aharon Barak,
Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW 13
(Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001); Manfred Nowak & Karolina
Miriam Januszewski, Non-State Actors and Human Rights, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (Math Noorman et al. eds., 2015).
90
Roderick Macdonald, Postscript and Prelude—The Jurisprudence of the Charter:
Eight Theses, 4 SUP. CT. L. REV. 321, 347 (1982).
91
For an up-to-date running tab of activities, see BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR.,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en (last visited Oct. 5, 2022).
92
My use of the public-private dichotomy in this paper will be synonymous with the
state-versus-non-state divide.
93
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 134 (1993). (“[T]here
should be protection from all violations of human rights, and not only when the
violator can be directly identified as an agent of the State.”).
88
89
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One example where this public-private distinction is made, but
with diminishing theoretical justification, is in the contrast between
torts and human rights, exemplified more specifically in the case of Al
Shimari v. Caci International, Inc. 94 In Al Shimari, allegations of torture
were brought against private military contractors for abusing
detainees along with U.S. soldiers. The applicants founded their claim
on the bases of common law tort and torture, but the district court
stated that the claim of torture was only permissible by virtue of the
Alien Tort Statute’s specific inclusion of international law as applicable
grounds. Barring this allowance, the harm inflicted would have been
classified solely as a tort and not as a human rights violation. A claim
of human rights violations against private contractors is further
complicated by the fact that the claimant must prove that the private
actor was performing an “inherently governmental function.” 95 And
even if this was the case, the defendants would then be able to
challenge any claim against their actions on the grounds of the
“political question doctrine.” 96 The political question doctrine bars
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796 (E.D. Va. 2013). This
discussion is drawn from CHARAMBA, supra note 7.
95
For various definitions of an “inherently governmental function,” see, for example,
KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42325, DEFINITIONS OF “INHERENTLY
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION” IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW AND GUIDANCE 1
(2014).
96
“The political question doctrine, at its core, recognizes as nonjusticiable any
question whose resolution is committed to a coordinate branch of government and
whose evaluation by a court would require the application of standards judicially
undiscoverable or judicially unmanageable.” Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, 658 F.3d 413,
421 (4th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); see Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004). In
Baker, the hallmark political question doctrine case, the Supreme Court set forth the
boundaries of the political question doctrine. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209. The court defined
a political question as any case that presented one of the following attributes: (1) “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department”; (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it”; (3) “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government”; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made”; or (6) “the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. This is also cited in Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 420.
94
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courts from reviewing the merits of a claim due to a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction—the claim is deemed to be non-justiciable. This is
what happened in Al Shimari. The court accepted CACI’s claim that the
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction as CACI was acting under the
“direct” and “plenary” control of the U.S. military and because
national defense interests were “closely intertwined” with the military
decisions governing the defendant’s conduct. 97 Weaving private party
actions into governmental function in this manner served to absolve
the private actors of responsibility for human rights violations, to
perpetuate the idea that only public actors can commit human rights
violations, to undermine the rule of law, and ultimately, to deny the
claimants access to justice.
However, in the recent decision of Nevsun Resources Ltd. v.
Araya, the Canadian Supreme Court upended this public-private
distinction between torts and human rights violations stemming from
customary international law. 98 In that case, three Eritrean workers
claimed “that they were indefinitely conscripted through Eritrea’s
military service into a forced labour regime where they were required
to work at a mine in Eritrea.” 99 They claimed that “they were subjected
to violent, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.” 100 The mine was
owned partly by a Canadian mining company, Nevsun Resources Ltd.,
and partly by the Eritrean government. 101 Subsequently, after fleeing
Eritrea and becoming refugees, the Eritrean workers initiated legal
proceedings against Nevsun for “breaches of customary international
law prohibitions against forced labour; slavery; cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity.” 102 They also
Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 441. The two-factor test developed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in light of Baker, for cases involving government
contractors was announced in Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. There,
the court noted that an affirmative answer to either of these two parts would render
the claim non-justiciable. More specifically, the court held that “if a military
contractor operates under the plenary control of the military, the contractor’s decisions
may be considered as de facto military decisions.” Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root
Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 410 (4th Cir. 2011).
98
Nevsun Res. Ltd. v. Araya, [2020] S.C.R. 5 (Can.).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at ¶ 7.
102
Id. at ¶ 4.
97
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“sought damages for breaches of domestic torts including conversion,
battery, ‘unlawful confinement’ (false imprisonment), conspiracy and
negligence. 103
As part of their defense, Nevsun argued that “the claims based
on customary international law should be struck because they have no
reasonable prospect of success.” 104 The Chambers Judge dismissed
Nevsun’s motion to strike, and the Court of Appeal agreed. 105 The
Canadian Supreme Court upheld those decisions. 106 Writing for the
majority, Justice Abella stated that customary international law forms
a part of the Canadian common law through the doctrine of adoption
absent legislation to the contrary. 107 What was particularly striking of
the customary international legal norms that were raised was their
status as peremptory norms, or jus cogens, clearly identifiable norms
from which no derogation is permitted. 108 Judicial action to ensure that
these norms be respected under Canadian law was paramount. Such a
stance could thus result in the direct remediation by the company
based on a breach of customary international law. Justice Abella
reasoned as follows:
While courts can, of course, address the extent and
seriousness of harm arising from civil wrongs with
tools like an award of punitive damages, these
responses may be inadequate when it comes to the
violation of the norms prohibiting forced labour;
slavery; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or
crimes against humanity. The profound harm resulting
from their violation is sufficiently distinct in nature
from those of existing torts that, as the workers say,
“[i]n the same way that torture is something more than
battery, slavery is more than an amalgam of unlawful
confinement, assault and unjust enrichment”.
Accepting this premise, which seems to be difficult to
103

Id.
Id. at ¶ 5.
105
Id. at ¶ 6.
106
Id. at ¶ 40.
107
Id. at ¶ 128.
108
Id. at ¶¶ 83. 114.
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refute conceptually, reliance on existing domestic torts
may not “do justice to the specific principles that
already are, or should be, in place with respect to the
human rights norm.” 109
The workers’ customary international law pleadings
are broadly worded and offer several ways in which
the violation of adopted norms of customary
international law may potentially be compensable in
domestic law. The mechanism for how these claims
should proceed is a novel question that must be left to
the trial judge. The claims may well be allowed to
proceed based on the recognition of new nominate
torts, but this is not necessarily the only possible route
to resolving the Eritrean workers’ claims. A
compelling argument can also be made, based on their
pleadings, for a direct approach recognizing that since
customary international law is part of Canadian
common law, a breach by a Canadian company can
theoretically be directly remedied based on a breach of
customary international law. . . . [e]ffectively and justly
remedying breaches of customary international law
may demand an approach of a different character than
a typical “private law action in the nature of a tort
claim.” 110
The Canadian Supreme Court’s position on this matter is
striking and paves the way for new precedent that could have
significant repercussions for private actor liability in relation to human
rights violations. It is significant because of how it expands access to
justice, but even more so conceptually because it takes direct aim at the
Araya, 5 S.C.R. ¶ 126. See Craig M. Scott, Translating Torture into Transnational
Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate Accountability for Human
Rights Harms, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 45, 62 n.4 (2001); see
also Sandra Raponi, Grounding a Cause of Action for Torture in Transnational Law,
in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 373 (2001).
110
Araya, 5 S.C.R. ¶ 127-29. See City of Vancouver v. Ward, [2010] S.C.R. 28, ¶ 22
(Can.) (citing Dunlea v. Attorney-General, [2000] NZCA 84).
109
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normative sacred lamb that only states can be liable for human rights
violations under international law, and the subordination of a private
individual’s
potential
impact
on
another’s
dignity. 111
Notwithstanding, the case is an exception to prevailing orthodoxy and
is emblematic of the challenges in relying upon piecemeal reform by
either court judgments or individual state legislation to address
corporate human rights risks in a globalized economy. 112
III.

ESTABLISHING A CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Given the impacts that corporations can have on human rights,
global actors have been trying for many years to reach an accord on
the appropriate approach towards the regulation of transnational
business. 113 In 2005, Professor John Ruggie was appointed to the
position of UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises to try to pave a way forward on the matter. After six years
and two renewals of his position, Professor Ruggie produced the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding

As the Court did not address directly Nevsun’s liability, the eventual trial of the
matter would have been followed very closely indeed. This did not come to pass,
however, as Nevsun is reported to have settled the case outside of court for an
undisclosed sum. See Yvette Brend, Landmark settlement is a message to Canadian
companies extracting resources overseas: Amnesty International, CBC NEWS (Oct.
23, 2020, 4:13 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/settlementamnesty-scc-africa-mine-nevsun-1.5774910.
112
There is a noticeable trend towards increased national corporate due diligence
legislation from states and bodies such as France, the Netherlands, California, the EU,
and the UK. While these developments should be applauded, they will require many
more states to take similar action in a coordinated and concerted manner. Anything
less will result in fragmentation, regulatory arbitrage, and largely inefficient
governance regimes, given the global nature of supply and value chains. See National
and Regional Developments on mHRDD, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR.,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/big-issues/mandatory-due-diligence/natio
nal-regional-developments-on-mhrdd (last visited Oct. 5, 2022).
113
John Gerard Ruggie, Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: Lessons
from Business and Human Rights, 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF
MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 5, 5 (2014).
111
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Principles”) in 2011. 114 The Guiding Principles were unanimously
endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council and swiftly embraced by
governments, standard-setting bodies, corporations, and civil society
organizations. 115
The Guiding Principles are structured around the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” framework, which consists of three pillars:
(1)
the state duty to protect against human rights abuses
by third parties, including businesses, through
appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication;
(2)
an independent corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, which means to avoid infringing on the
rights of others and to address adverse impacts with
which companies are involved; and
(3)
the need for greater access for victims to effective
remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. 116
Pillar One is a codification of existing international legal
obligations on states; Pillar Two represents the moral responsibility of
corporations to be good corporate citizens, as is expected of them; and
Pillar Three is a call for both of those groups to provide access to
remedies to victims of human rights violations.
Developed following a philosophy of “principled
pragmatism,” 117 the Guiding Principles are the “global authoritative

U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, supra note 9.
For an up-to-date running tab of activities, see BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., supra
note 91. Prominent examples of their usage include the new provisions in the OECD
Common Approaches for Export Credit Agencies requiring assessments of social
risks, which affect access to capital at the national level; the new International Finance
Corporation Sustainability Principles and Performance Standards as well as the
associated “Equator Principles”; and the “ISO26000,” a new social responsibility
guidance adopted by the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”). The
Guiding Principles have also been endorsed by the European Commission, as well as
the United States through Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act and will soon be endorsed by the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) as well as the African Union. See Ruggie, supra note 113,
at 11-12.
116
U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, supra note 9, ¶ 7.
117
RUGGIE, supra note 30, at xlii-xliii (describing “principled pragmatism” as “an
unflinching commitment to the principle of strengthening the promotion and
protection of human rights as it relates to business, coupled with a pragmatic
114
115
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standard on business and human rights.” 118 The pillars reflect the
consensus and desire among global actors to collaborate on the issue
of business and human rights and their inception should be lauded.
Yet, they still engender a system that places the predominant
responsibility to protect human rights on states. The corporate
responsibility to respect is primarily a moral one of due diligence, an
expectation that companies identify, manage, and remedy their
potential and actual human rights impacts. This overall approach
provides a potential path toward assisting companies to be responsible
actors while acting within a state’s jurisdiction. But is this still
appropriate when we step into a digital realm in which the
Westphalian paradigm is not easily transposed?
The Westphalian paradigm is important to consider because it
underpins the current international legal human rights framework 119
and is the basis through which the theoretical and functional
arguments for corporate responsibility to protect are engaged. In this
paradigm, the individual, as either a natural or corporate person, is
subordinate to the authority of the state. This entails two
presumptions. First, there is parity between the corporation and the
natural person, at least from the state’s perspective. Both are subjects
and subject to its jurisdiction, within its jurisdiction. Second, there is a
power dynamic that is built into this formula that the state carries more
power than the individual (natural or corporate). While this remains
true for the natural person, it is increasingly less true for
corporations. 120
attachment to what works best in creating change where it matters most – in the daily
lives of people.” (footnote omitted)).
118
INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA PRACTICAL GUIDE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR
BUSINESS LAWYERS 13 (2016).
119
Richard A. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the
International Legal Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32
(Cyril E. Black ed., 1969).
120
See e.g. NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER 1, 7 (2003) (reporting that in
2001, fifty-one of the one hundred largest economies in the world were corporations,
while the other forty-nine were states; the hundred largest corporations controlled
twenty percent of global foreign assets; and the sales of Ford and General Motors were
greater than the GDP of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa). It is significant that this
was drawn from 2001. By 2018, it was 157 corporations out of 200 entities, either
states or corporations combined. 69 of the richest 100 entities on the planet are
corporations, not governments, figures show, GLOB. JUST. NOW (Oct. 17, 2018),
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Theoretically, these presumptions and dynamics are upended
in possible conceptions of a metaverse. While corporations and natural
persons interact with one another in the jurisdiction of a state as
individuals, individuals in a metaverse will be inhabiting worlds and
spaces created by programmers and corporations. This can invoke a
Westphalian-like paradigm in which the corporation assumes the
authoritative role, and the avatar (the natural person’s digital
representation) is subordinated to the power of the corporation. The
corporation determines the circumstances within which the person can
exist in that space in ways that are significantly distinct from, for
example, merely entering the physical premises of a corporation in the
physical world. To participate within the realms of a metaverse, digital
persons may need to abide by the rules or laws instituted by the
corporation, not unlike platforms today. This can relate to how they
act, transact, or interact and considers the basis upon which someone
can own property and use (crypto)currency. Whether there will be a
tax is still to be determined, but this could be a “subscription fee,” or
acceding your (monetizable) data to the corporation. The corporate
creator of this digital space, this metaverse, assumes the de facto role
of sovereign ruler. This is the crux of the theoretical argument. By this
analysis alone, there are grounds to submit that corporations in this
position should have to assume the protection of (digital) human
rights, at least in this space and under similar circumstances. Some
commentators have already called for some variation of a digital bill
of rights. 121
Functionally, this description is a loose list of some of the
characteristics that we typically associate with the powers of a state,
hence the reference to de facto sovereign status. However, one could
take this analysis one step further regarding whether corporations
could be considered states, as derived from public international law.
Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States provides the widely held definition of a state, which is:
(a)
a permanent population;
https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/69-richest-100-entities-planet-arecorporations-not-governments-figures-show.
121
See, e.g., Raph Koster, Declaring the Rights of Players, RALPH KOSTER’S WEB.
(Aug. 27, 2000), https://www.raphkoster.com/games/essays/declaring-the-rights-ofplayers.
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(b)
a defined territory;
(c)
government; and
(d)
capacity to enter into relations with the other states. 122
While it is still some time away from a proper determination
of whether these criteria will be met, it is possible to envisage a
situation in which corporations could have created digital spaces or
metaverses in which they could be considered states under this
definition. Indeed, if companies such as Meta and Microsoft are
building their own versions of a metaverse, it is likely that these will
be distinct spaces that digital persons can inhabit. Meta and Microsoft
would serve as “governments” and agreements between the
companies specifying levels of interoperability and portability would
determine an individual’s ability to “travel” across these spaces and
interact as one would do in the physical world when they leave and
enter a different state, country, or jurisdiction.
This functional exercise of authority that is typically associated
with the state is the basis of the final argument for a corporate
responsibility to protect. The exercise of authority to govern
individuals, their actions, and their spaces is an exercise of regulation.
Where the ability to exercise that authority is concentrated within an
actor, it is incumbent upon that actor to exercise the authority in a way
that maintains order for all individuals participating within that space.
The need for order, which entails some respect for participants’ rights,
is an implicit or explicit condition of all participants who take part in
that space. Where no other actor can exercise that authority, as is the
case within a metaverse created and facilitated by a corporate actor,
then the exercise of that authority becomes a responsibility. Such is the
position that we know the state to assume, and such is the concomitant
responsibility that is placed upon it. This same logic should apply to
corporate actors in similar circumstances. This is a challenge to
prevailing notions of how regulatory authority should be accorded
along public-private lines. 123

Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International
Conference of American States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
123
Many authors have challenged the continued relevance of the public-private
distinction in relation to the exercise of regulation and more specifically in the context
of lawmaking, a domain that is typically reserved for, or associated with, the state. See
122
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This reasoning draws in part from approaches to regulation
within financial sectors. There, regulators adopt the principle of “same
activity, same regulation.” 124 This idea has been referred to recently
within the context of BigTech and new FinTech companies beginning
to offer financial services. 125 While BigTech companies may have
initially begun as intermediaries facilitating financial services between
customers and traditional financial institutions, they have increasingly
begun to start offering their own financial products, starting with
payments and extending into credit, insurance, savings, and
investments. 126 On occasion, this is facilitated using their own balance
sheets. As they assume these functions, financial regulators are forced
to consider the risk that they pose to consumers and financial markets
notwithstanding that they may not meet the strict definition of a
relevant financial institution, such as a bank or a money transmitter,
for example. 127 Consequently, there is a focus on developing
regulatory responses on the basis of the activities conducted by the
actor, rather than the status of the actor. 128 Similarly, there is a need for
us to recognize the actions and functions that are being fulfilled by
corporate actors within digital spaces and to confer responsibilities
accordingly. This begs the question as to what that responsibility
should entail. Given the earlier discussion of corporate power within
a metaverse, this should at least entail a responsibility to respect and
protect human rights within a digital space. This responsibility is
supplementary to all other existing and applicable regulations upon
the corporation and does not detract from any other protections

Sarah Michele Ford, Reconceptualizing the Public/Private Distinction in the Age of
Information Technology, 14 INFO., COMMC’N., & SOC’Y, 550, 567 (2011).
124
UK FIN., supra note 12; see also FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 12.
125
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 12.
126
See, e.g., Jon Frost et al., BigTech and the Changing Structure of Financial
Intermediation 2-7 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 779, 2019),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work779.pdf; Erik Feyen et al., Fintech and the Digital
Transformation of Financial Services: Implications for Market Structure and Public
Policy vi (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 117, 2021).
127
Id.
128
Fernando Restoy, Fintech Regulation: How to Achieve a Level Playing Field 5 (Fin.
Stability Inst., Occasional Paper No. 17, 2021), https://www.bis.org/fsi
/fsipapers17.htm.
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available to individuals, such as the state’s obligation to protect human
rights.
IV.

WEB2 OR WEB3 – DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

An interesting tangential discussion is the underlying stage of
web development that metaverses will be developed in—Web2 or
Web3. Over the course of its existence, the Internet has undergone
several stages of development. In recognition of that, commentators
seem to have settled upon three iterations: Web1, Web2, and Web3. 129
Web1, which spanned roughly between 1990 and 2005, was premised
on open protocols that were decentralized and communitygoverned. 130 This was the “read only” era when the Internet consisted
mostly of read-only home pages, 131 or the equivalent of an online
Yellow Pages. Most of the value accrued to the edges of the network:
users and builders. 132 Web2 can be classified as the “read-write” era of
the Internet and is marked by the rise of social networking and usergenerated content. 133 Occurring approximately between 2005-2020,
Web2 is the era in which users are able to interact with one another
mostly by posting media content on websites and platforms. 134
However, given the economic model associated with platforms, value
during this era accrued to a handful of companies, such as Google,

See, e.g., Gilad Edelman, The Father of Web3 Wants You to Trust Less, WIRED
(Nov. 29, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/web3-gavin-woodinterview; see Aaron Mak, What Is Web3 and Why Are All the Crypto People Suddenly
Talking About It?, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2021, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/technology
/2021/11/web3-explained-crypto-nfts-bored-apes.html; Graham Cormode &
Balachander Krishnamurthy, Key differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0, FIRST
MONDAY § 1 (2008), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2125
/1972.
130
Chris Dixon, Why Web3 Matters, FUTURE (Oct. 7, 2021), https://future.
a16z.com/why-web3-matters.
131
Jamie Carter, Back to basics: is Web 1.0 making a comeback?, TECHRADAR PRO
(Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.techradar.com/news/internet/web/is-web-1-0-making-abig-comeback-1291121.
132
Dixon, supra note 130.
133
William L. Hosch, Web 2.0, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/Web-20 (last visited Oct. 5, 2022).
134
Dixon, supra note 130.
129
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Amazon, and Facebook, rather than to the users. 135 Indeed, this version
of the Internet produced tremendous wealth and power for these
companies as their platforms are essentially centralized silos that
benefit from network effects and thus a concentration of users and
activities that generate troves of monetizable data. 136 However, the
next iteration of the Internet, Web3, is predicted to upend this model
as it “combines the decentralized, community-governed ethos of web1
with the advanced, modern functionality of web2.” 137
Web3 is a decentralized world built primarily on blockchain
technology and facilitated by tokens. 138 This transition is significant
because it could potentially mark the end of BigTech’s hold over the
Internet. Web3 could enable individuals to create new spaces and
realities that they own and can freely interact and transact in without
the feudalistic oversight or rent-seeking that is characteristic of current
Web2 platforms, i.e., BigTech firms. 139
A metaverse constructed in Web2 would deploy new
innovations in augmented and virtual reality to create immersive
digital landscapes and experiences. However, the deployment of such
technological innovation does not necessarily impact the underlying
economic and operational model that birthed BigTech firms and their
enjoyment of a “winner-takes-all” environment. The principal factors
that explain why this would continue to be the case are the
continuation of platforms, the utilization of data to foster network
effects, and an aggressive approach towards the acquisition of or
strategic mergers with perceived rivals.
See R. SRINIVASAN, PLATFORM BUSINESS MODELS: FRAMEWORKS, CONCEPTS AND
DESIGN (2021); see also GEOFFREY G. PARKER ET AL., PLATFORM REVOLUTION
(2016).
136
See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 12 (In this report, analysts at
the Bank for International Settlements discuss the expansion of BigTech firms into
other sectors, such as finance, through this business model.); see also IAN POLLARI,
THE RISE OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 2 (2018).
137
Dixon, supra note 130.
138
Ephrat Livni, Welcome to ‘Web3.’ What’s That?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/05/business/dealbook/what-is-web3.html.
139
See Chris Dixon & Packy McCormick, Chris Dixon and Packy McCormick on the
future of crypto, ECONOMIST (Nov. 8 2021), https://www.economist.com/the-worldahead/2021/11/08/chris-dixon-and-packy-mccormick-on-the-future-of-crypto;
see
also Thibault Meunier & In-Young Jo, Web3 – A vision for a decentralized web,
CLOUDFLARE (Oct. 1, 2021), https://blog.cloudflare.com/what-is-web3.
135

2022

BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

143

Platforms are a digital infrastructure that enable
intermediation among sets of users to transact or interact over a service
of perceived value. 140 Examples of this could be buyers and sellers, as
on E-Bay and Amazon, or drivers and ride-hailers on Uber or Lyft.
Platforms are successful business models in a tech-driven world
because of their ability to amass copious amounts of data. Data is
important not only because it fuels the underlying technology to be
more efficient and effective, but also because it gives the company the
means to enhance and offer a product or service that is better tailored
to its target market. As the platform’s users find greater utility in the
services being offered, this attracts more users onto the platform in an
exponential rate and begins to generate “network effects.”141 Network
effects occur when increasing numbers of individuals decide to use a
product or service because of the utility that arises from more people
using it. 142 For example, on an online marketplace such as Amazon,
buyers are inclined to use it because of the large number of sellers and
goods for sale on the site. The more buyers who use the site, the more
sellers will be attracted to post their wares on the site, and so on. As
more users transact on the platform, the company can gather more
data, and as they gather more data, they are able to offer more services,
thus attracting more users. It is a virtuous cycle.
Network effects have enabled BigTech companies to dominate
their markets and to make horizontal plays into associated industries
and sectors, such as music, finance, and groceries. For example,
although Amazon started off selling books, 143 it soon moved into a
wide array of fields such as finance by offering co-branded credit
cards, cloud services through Amazon Web Services, and video
streaming through Amazon Prime Video. 144 Facebook, similarly, after
starting from its humble dorm room origins as a site to view other
college students, soon became a tech behemoth that facilitates its own

See SRINIVASAN, supra note 135; see also PARKER ET AL., supra note 135.
ANDREW CHEN, THE COLD START PROBLEM: HOW TO START AND SCALE NETWORK
EFFECTS (2021).
142
Id. at 19.
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BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON
(2013).
144
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marketplace and was in the process of developing its own digital
currency, Diem (also formally known as Libra). 145
Finally, BigTech firms have also been able to grow significantly
because of their aggressive approach towards mergers and
acquisitions. Meta, for example, acquired Instagram back in 2012 when
it was valued at $1 billion and had thirteen employees. 146 Today, the
firm is worth $20 billion and has over one billion active users. The deal,
however, has been under considerable regulatory scrutiny because of
the anti-competitive allegations involved. 147 More recently, Meta
acquired eight firms that specialize in augmented and virtual
technologies in order to advance their offerings in their metaverse. 148
Microsoft, too, recently acquired Activision. 149
When viewed collectively, these factors help to explain why
and how BigTech firms could create large, all-encompassing digital
spaces that could facilitate so many activities for the benefit of their
users. Further, with the scale of their resources and the benefit of first
mover-advantage, BigTech firms could create walled gardens that
See Sam Dean, Why Facebook wants its own currency — and why that scares its
critics, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2019, 9:34 AM), https://www.latimes.
com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-facebook-libra-crypto-bitcoin-launch-20190617story.html. Meta has since decided to shut down the Diem project. See Antonio Ruiz
Camacho, Meta’s crypto project Diem to shut down after pushback from regulators,
CNET (Feb. 1, 2022, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/crypto
/metas-crypto-project-diem-to-shut-down-after-pushback-fromregulators/#:~:text=With%20the%20liquidation%20of%20Diem’s,project%20comes
%20to%20an%20end.&text=Diem%2C%20the%20cryptocurrency%20project%20b
acked,continuing%20resistance%20from%20federal%20regulators
146
Victor Luckerson, Here’s Proof That Instagram Was One of the Smartest
Acquisitions Ever, TIME (Apr. 19, 2016, 12:31 PM), https://time.com/4299297
/instagram-facebook-revenue.
147
See Casey Newton & Nilay Patel, ‘Instagram can hurt us’: Mark Zuckerberg
emails outline plan to neutralize competitors, VERGE (Jul. 29, 2020, 2:07 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/29/21345723/facebook-instagram-documentsemails-mark-zuckerberg-kevin-systrom-hearing.
148
What America’s largest technology firms are investing in, ECONOMIST (Jan. 22,
2022), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/01/22/what-americas-largest-tech
nology-firms-are-investing-in.
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Microsoft to acquire Activision Blizzard to bring the joy and community of gaming
to everyone, across every device, MICROSOFT (Jan. 18, 2022), https://news
.microsoft.com/2022/01/18/microsoft-to-acquire-activision-blizzard-to-bring-the-joy
-and-community-of-gaming-to-everyone-across-every-device.
145

2022

BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

145

crowd out smaller competitors, limit the options available for users,
and continue to generate significant revenues. Interoperability and
portability are not something that they would be incentivized to
promote or embed within their metaverses as their goal would be to
concentrate activity on their platforms and minimize their churn rate.
Consequently, a metaverse built in Web2 could only lead to either a
continuation or development of more acute problems that result from
current BigTech practices.
A metaverse constructed in Web3, on the other hand, is
presented as a contradistinction to Web2. It is an idealized application
and a more democratic vision of what can be achieved in this next
phase of the Internet. This metaverse conception also immerses us in a
digital reality in which we can act, transact, and interact, but as
autonomous persons with the ability to own our own property
through the use of self-sovereign identity and private keys. 150
Transactions involving one’s property are maintained and immutably
recorded on the blockchain, all with the benefit of not requiring an
intermediary, such as a BigTech platform. 151 In a fully realized Web3,
commentators equally envisage being able to use that property in a
range of scenarios and across digital spaces through built-in full
interoperability and portability. 152 This new digital reality thus opens
up a tremendous wealth of opportunities for individuals to engage
beyond the dominance of BigTech. While some commentators rightly
idealize a new utopian internet paradigm that is decentralized and
thus breaks the grip of current BigTech giants—an “Open
Metaverse” 153—it is difficult to ignore the sheer might and resources
that these companies are deploying in their quests to stake their part
See, e.g., Satoru Hori, Self-sovereign identity: the future of personal data
ownership?, WORLD ECON. F. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.weforum.org
/agenda/2021/08/self-sovereign-identity-future-personal-data-ownership; see also
MARCOS ALLENDE LÓPEZ, SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY: THE FUTURE OF IDENTITY:
SELF-SOVEREIGNTY, DIGITAL WALLETS, AND BLOCKCHAIN 25 (2020),
https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Self-Sovereign-IdentityThe-Future-of-Identity-Self-Sovereignity-Digital-Wallets-and-Blockchain.pdf.
151
LÓPEZ, supra note 150.
152
Ferriss, supra note 70.
153
See, e.g., William Gibson, The Open Metaverse: The future is already here, its just
not very evenly distributed, CRUCIBLE, https://crucible.network/open-metaverse (last
visited Oct. 5, 2022).
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in the creation of metaverses today. 154 Indeed, one cannot overlook or
underestimate what BigTech firms have been able to achieve during
this Web2 era. Consequently, one should bear two points in mind.
First, given that a fully realized Web3 is still a very distant
proposition, for at least technological, computational, and usability
reasons, it is likely that the first metaverse offerings will be based on a
Web2 model. The reality of decentralized applications at present, even
with early stage Web3, is that a centralized platform is still needed to
help facilitate exchange. 155 Second, even if Web3 is fully realized, the
paradox of decentralized practices and communities is that they
require some centralized, shared understanding of how members
within that community should behave—the rules and protocols that
will hold them together in a kind of aporia. 156 This is an opinion shared
by analysts at the Bank for International Settlements on the parallel
development of “DeFi,” or decentralized finance, a new of form of
intermediation in crypto markets that operates on similar technologies
underlying Web3 development. 157 They counsel that an “unregulated”
What America’s largest technology firms are investing in, supra note 148.
See, e.g., Moxie Marlinspike, My first impressions of web3, MOXIE (Jan. 7, 2022),
https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html.
156
The aporia in this case refers to the design and desire of decentralized autonomy of
the actors within the metaverse on one hand, and the need to have some shared rules,
which may limit their autonomy in order to ensure collective and individual wellbeing,
yet wanting to maintain autonomy. This tension can only be resolved through the
creation of some shared governance rules, principles, or values. A similar conclusion
was reached by the classic libertarian scholar, Robert Nozick, as he reasoned that even
the most rudimentary of societies would develop a structure or entity that exercised
functions that we would associate with a government. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, UTOPIA (1974).
157
See, e.g., Sirio Aramonte et al., DeFi risks and the decentralisation illusion, BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf
/r_qt2112b.htm (“Decentralised finance (DeFi) is touted as a new form of
intermediation in crypto markets. The key elements of this ecosystem are novel
automated protocols on blockchains – to support trading, lending and investment of
cryptoassets – and stablecoins that facilitate fund transfers. There is a ‘decentralisation
illusion’ in DeFi since the need for governance makes some level of centralisation
inevitable and structural aspects of the system lead to a concentration of power. If
DeFi were to become widespread, its vulnerabilities might undermine financial
stability. These can be severe because of high leverage, liquidity mismatches, built-in
interconnectedness and the lack of shock absorbers such as banks. Existing
governance mechanisms in DeFi would provide natural reference points for authorities
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DeFi network could pose risks to broader financial stability. 158 This is
the “decentralization illusion” in DeFi. 159 This line of reasoning
extends to social inequities as well, since decision-making processes,
whether by humans or by code, are prone to inherent prejudice and
bias that can impact an individual’s human rights—civic, social,
political, or economic 160—and accentuate inequities. Digital
communities need shared values that include a respect for and
perhaps an obligation to protect the wellbeing of its members.
Consequently, there should be some guiding principles that ensure
that digital human rights are respected as innovation continues to
advance.
CONCLUSION
The idea of applying human rights obligations to corporations
is one with growing traction but also one that has met resistance for
reasons of jurisprudence and vested interests. 161 There is equally
legitimate concern that simply saying that private actors should be
subject to human rights obligations is much easier than making it
happen. This is true. The concept of human rights as it currently stands
under international law is much broader than just prohibitions or
negative obligations. The “respect, protect and fulfil” framework 162
applicable to human rights entails both negative and positive
obligations. States have obligations to “adopt legislative, judicial,
administrative, educative and other appropriate measures in order to
fulfil their legal obligations.” 163 Concurrently, states also have the right
to limit individuals’ rights and apply exceptions to the application of
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human rights. 164 In the physical world, corporations do not have the
authority to curtail peoples’ rights and freedoms in this way. In a
digital realm or metaverse, however, they can. In a metaverse,
corporations could have the prerogative to limit an individual’s
(digital) human rights in a manner “prescribed by law” and for reasons
“necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 165 This flies in the face of
prevailing international human rights law theory and foundations.
Consequently, perhaps it is time for us to consider at least an
obligation to respect and protect (digital) human rights. This is noting
that, under current international human rights law doctrine, the
obligation to respect means that the duty bearer must refrain from
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. “The
obligation to protect requires [duty bearers] to protect individuals and
groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means
that [duty bearers] must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment
of basic human rights.” 166 To argue for the final element, the obligation
to fulfil, may be one step too far as it can invoke notions of citizenship
and civic duties in exchange for state benefits. These aspects of
constitutionalism are fascinating corollary ideas to consider seriously,
but beyond the scope of what can be addressed reasonably in this
Article. Nevertheless, as Michelle Bachelet counsels, “[a]s the digital
frontiers expand, one of our greatest challenges as a human rights
community will be to help companies and societies to implement the
international human rights framework in the land we have not yet
reached.” 167
As part of this conclusion, three final points bear mentioning.
First, while there is both normative and practical merit in the publicU.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R ON HUM. RTS. & INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, HUMAN
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(2016),
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165
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18, ratified June 8, 1992,
1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
166
International Human Rights Law, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R ON HUM. RTS.,
www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx (last visited Sept.
5, 2022).
167
Bachelet, supra note 44.
164

2022

BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

149

private distinction as a concept for evaluating the allocation of
regulatory authority, legitimacy, and function, the broader pace of
technological innovation, privatization, and globalization means that
we should review its application for suitability periodically.
Second, while a premise of this Article’s argument takes aim at
static interpretation and application of the public-private distinction in
the formulation of regulation, another premise is along more
functional lines. It employs a functional approach to regulation, as is
the practice within financial system regulation, where regulation
focuses on the activities of actors as opposed to the status or
classification of the actor. This is summed up in the regulatory
principle “same activity, same regulation.” 168 By application, this
Article merely points out the new governance and police powers of
corporations in digital spaces and question whether this should merit
a reconsideration of the responsibilities that should hold in light of the
potential impacts.
Finally, it should be noted that none of this should imply a
diminution of existing state obligations to protect human rights. The
extension of a corporate obligation to respect and protect does not
extinguish a rights holder’s ability to pursue alternative remedial
avenues where a duty bearer may have violated their human rights.
Considered from the perspective of Wesley Hohfeld’s claim-right, the
claimant is merely exercising her claim-right against a corporation that
owes her a duty—a duty of care, a duty not to commit harm, or a duty
to respect her human rights, for example. 169 The fact that she exercises
her right in this instance does not extinguish any of the other claimrights that she may have against other duty holders.
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